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Syntactic constraints on discourse structure:
the case of /f-clefts*
JUDY DELIN and JON OBERLANDER
Abstract
In this paper, we present an account of the interpretation of it-cleft construc-
tions that attempts to draw together the apparently diverse factors of aspect,
information structure, syntax, and presupposition. We begin with the obser-
vation (due to Prince 1978) that some clefts have the effect of "background-
ing" the information they convey, and that, in addition, clefts appear to
indicate that this information is in some sense "known fact." We also add
the observation that in some contexts clefts can induce temporal reversals
in the interpretation of the narrative order of events and note that clefts
appear to limit the range of coherence relations that can be inferred between
their content and that of the preceding discourse. We argue that these
effects arise out of the way cleft content is incorporated into the existing
discourse context; further, we suggest that the integration of cleft content
is further influenced by the individual semantic, pragmatic, and informa-
tional profile of the cleft concerned. Our account draws on the notion of
clefts as state-making devices: that is, they introduce an eventuality descrip-
tion with stative aspect, due to the presence of copular be as main verb.
We look at the implications this has for discourse processing, showing how
the interpretation of the cleft's stative main verb as temporally overlapping
an established reference time has effects on the integration of cleft content
into the discourse model. While this aspectual profile is common to all
clefts, integration is further influenced by whether the cleft's presupposition
contains material already known to the hearer (topic) or new (comment).
While we cannot provide a complete model of discourse and temporal
relations, we hope to show that the specific discourse relations taken to
hold between incoming and existing information depend on a subtle
interaction between a range of factors that influence the integration
process.
Linguistics 33 (1995), 465-500 0024-3949/95/0033-0465
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1. Introduction
This paper represents a case study in modelling both temporal and
structural aspects of discourse. In it, we look at how zY-clefts, with their
rich array of semantic and pragmatic features, can be accounted for in
an abstract model of discourse processing. In particular, our account
aims to explain the following specific observations:
- clefts are not a homogeneous group: they differ in their information
structure and function (cf. Prince 1978; Hedberg 1990; inter alia);
- the different cleft types seem to be tied to differing discourse effects;
- all clefts, however, are presuppositional;
- clefts represent an operation on semantic content that can be viewed
in terms of the introduction of a Stative eventuality, due to the presence
of the copular verb;
- clefts are explicable not only in terms of notions like focus and
presupposition, but in terms of less well understood discourse effects such
as backgrounding and the "known-fact effect" observed by Prince (1978).
In addition, however, there are general constraints on the discourse
relations cleft content can enter into; see Delin (1989), Delin and
Oberlander (1991, 1992).
We suggest in this paper that, given the necessary background, these
apparently diverse observations can be located coherently within a theory
of cleft interpretation.
In preliminary reports on this research (see Delin and Oberlander 1991,
1992) we have taken the view that clefts act as stativizing devices: that
is, that they present their entire content as if it were a stative eventuality
description (or complex of such descriptions). We have since realized,
however, that it is not the entire cleft content that is made stative: the
stative effect is confined, as might be expected, to the eventuality descrip-
tion due to the copular verb. The aspectual profile of the other reported
eventualities remains unchanged. What is significant, however, is that the
state description due to the copula is the MAIN eventuality of the sentence,
and it is with respect to this that the entire content of the cleft is integrated
into a model of the discourse. In this paper, we pursue this view, looking
at how the two types of deleft described in the literature (topic-clause
and comment-clause clefts, to adopt Hedberg's [1990] terms) are treated
in processing terms, on account of their differing information structure.
We show how aspectual interpretation works for each type of cleft, the
effect this has on integration into the discourse model, and how both
together serve to constrain the kinds of coherence relation that can be
inferred to hold between the discourse segments thus integrated. In partic-
ular, we concentrate on explaining (i) the limited range of discourse
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relations that information supplied by means of a cleft can support; and
(ii) the observations due to Prince (1978) that clefts apparently serve the
purpose of "backgrounding" the information they convey and of indicat-
ing that this information is "known fact." While it is by no means perfect
or complete, we hope that the study may advance our understanding of
discourse processing through a close description of particular features of
the data.
To frame our observations on discourse structure and coherence rela-
tions, we have attempted to use a neutral and transparent notation that
owes something to that of Polanyi and Scha (Polanyi 1986, 1988; Scha
and Polanyi 1988), augmented with coherence relations of our own. Our
study has been based on naturally occurring data, drawn primarily from
the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of Written English.1 Supplementary
data, both written and spoken, are taken from the clefts literature, in
particular Prince (1978) and Hedberg (1990), and from the clefts corpus
described in Delin (1989).
1.1. The structure of the paper
In the rest of this section, we go on to describe the precedents for
assuming that there are two kinds of z'i-cleft and describe the features of
each. In section 2, we explain the discourse functions of each kind of
cleft, showing how each supports different inferences about the coherence
relations that can hold between its content and that of the preceding
discourse. Section 3 goes on to describe the basics of aspectual semantics
that are needed to understand our account and describes the aspectual
profile of the content of clefts. In section 4, we look at how cleft content
is integrated into discourse structure. In section 5 we use the discourse
and temporal descriptions just established to explain the "background"
and "known-fact" effects of using a cleft, and we address some puzzles
of our own. These relate to the ability of some clefts to reverse temporal
flow in discourse, and the ability of others to generate contrastive effects.
Finally, in section 6, we provide a summary, a discussion of the implica-
tions of the work, and some suggestions for further research.
1.2. Two types of it-cleft
While many of our observations apply generally to zY-clefts, we will need
to make use of a distinction between two classes of iY-cleft, differing in
function and to some extent in structure, that have been observed in the
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literature. The first group correspond to what Prince (1978) terms the
stressed-focus //-clefts. These have a nuclear accent on the clefted constitu-
ent, and a weakly stressed cleft clause (Prince 1978: 896ff.), as follows
(Prince's example [42a]):
(1) It's HERE I look like Mina Davis.
The clefted constituent bears new, often contrastive information, and the
cleft clause bears known or old information (and as a result, may often
be elided or simply deleted altogether).
Hedberg (1990: 135ff.) refers to this type as topic-clause clefts.
Hedberg's notion of topic is based on the idea that the topic encapsulates
what the sentence is "about," and that individual sentence topics deter-
mine what is the topic of the discourse at the time at which they occur.
Hedberg (1990: 20) further notes that topics are "given" in the discourse,
in the sense that they conform to Gundel's (1985) "topic-familiarity
condition." This is stated as follows:
Topic-familiarity condition:
An entity, E, can successfully serve as a topic, Γ, iff both speaker and
addressee have previous knowledge of or familiarity with E.
Hedberg (1990: 10) follows Gundel (1985, 1988) in defining "topic" and
"comment":
Topic:
An entity, E, is the topic of a sentence, S, iff, in using S, the speaker
intends to increase the addressee's knowledge about, request informa-
tion about, or otherwise get the addressee to act with respect to E.
Comment:
A predication, P, is the comment of a sentence, 5, iff, in using S, the
speaker intends P to be assessed relative to the topic of S.
There exists a second cleft type, referred to by Prince as the informative-
presupposition (IP) cleft and by Hedberg as the comment-clause cleft.
This has a recognizably different stress pattern and information structure.
Examples are as follows (Prince's [41b] and [46a]):
(2) The leaders of the militant homophile movement in America gen-
erally have been the young people. It was they who fought back
during a violent police raid on a Greenwich Village bar in 1969, an
incident from which many gays date the birth of the modern crusade
for homosexual rights.
(3) It was ten years ago this month that Irwin Vamplew was bopped
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on the head by a nightstick while smashing windows in Berkeley in
order to end the war in Vietnam.
In this type of cleft, the information borne by the clefted constituent is
frequently old or anaphoric, while the cleft clause bears information that
is new to the hearer. As a result, the cleft clause cannot be deleted, since
it is the main information-bearing locus of the sentence. Usually, the
clefted constituent is a subject NP or an adverbial of time, place, or
manner, and the relativizer is not deletable (Prince 1978: 899).
Here, we adopt Hedberg's terms topic-clause (TC) and comment-clause
(CC) to distinguish between the two cleft types where appropriate. We
also follow Hedberg in using the term clefted constituent to refer to the
element appearing immediately after the copula in the cleft (often referred
to elsewhere as the "focus constituent"). The relative-clause-like constitu-
ent forming the remainder of the cleft is termed the cleft clause.
2. Clefts in discourse
In this section, we would like to examine some important discourse
functions of clefts and outline some puzzles associated with them. While
all zY-clefts have many features in common, it seems that the distinction
between the two types of cleft made above is amply justified by their
different uses in discourse. Below, we draw attention to some common
cleft functions and point out some particular factors in cleft interpretation
we believe can be accounted for by a closer analysis of the relationship
between aspectual information, discourse structure, and other, better-
known, features of clefts.
One such feature, whose existence we treat as a basic assumption of
this research, is that clefts require or convey some species of PRESUPPOSI-
TION (see, for example, Keenan 1971; Chomsky 1971; Gazdar 1979; inter
alia). We assume here that cleft content can be divided into two parts,
presupposed and asserted, on the basis of their syntax. This division is
unchanged by the information status (such as given, new, and so on) of
the content of either part.2 Similarly, it is often observed that cleft
constructions serve to indicate that the clefted constituent is a UNIQUE or
EXHAUSTIVE listing of the elements that can satisfy the predicate communi-
cated by the cleft clause (cf. Halvorsen 1978: 15; Atlas and Levinson
1981; inter alia); this we take to be relatively uncontroversial. Both the
notion of presupposition and the notion of uniqueness will be drawn
upon in our subsequent discussion.
What we believe to be new about our account, however, is the promi-
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nence it gives to the role of the cleft as a device for presenting information
with a particular ASPECTUAL profile. Simple canonical noncleft sentences
can be seen as presenting descriptions of states, events, and processes. A
cleft presentation of comparable content not only conveys such descrip-
tions (in presupposed form), but presents an ADDITIONAL state descrip-
tion, due to the presence of copular be as the main verb. It is our view
that the presence of this copula, and the resulting stative aspect of the
construction, has important semantic and pragmatic effects.
As the above discussion implies, we take clefts, like many other prag-
matically marked syntactic constructions, to convey not a single semantic
or pragmatic feature but a bundle of such features, acting jointly to
determine the discourse functions a sentence type can serve. These fea-
tures are not necessarily orthogonal: for example, it appears that presup-
position, uniqueness, and stative aspect play a primary role in determining
how discourse relations are constrained — that is, they account for the
constraining effect. Whatever the relationships between the features, how-
ever, it seems plausible to assume that speakers choose a sentence type
that best fits their conversational goals in a given context, and that a
range of factors, rather than a single one, determines this choice.
2.1. Topic-clause clefts in discourse
Topic-clause clefts are often taken to be in some sense the "basic" type
of zf-cleft, possibly because the default articulation of citation forms tends
to suggest this interpretation. Two particular discourse functions can be
isolated for this type of cleft, and we will term these question-answer and
contrast.
The question-answer relation is illustrated by (4) below:
(4) A: So who broke this?
B: It was John who broke it.
In this case, the cleft provides the completion of an incomplete proposi-
tion — that is, one containing a variable. The second function, that of
contrast, is similar, except that there are available in the discourse COM-
PETING instantiations for a variable, of which the cleft provides one.
Contrast (cf. Leech 1981; Lyons 1977; for a discussion) can be described
as a relationship of opposition or comparison between discourse elements,
operating on the basis of some predicate. In the case of (5) below, a
contrast holds between the clefted constituent the angel and a preceding
element, Boaz. The predicate that provides the coherent relationship
supporting the contrast can be given as use this form of greeting:
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(5) To this the reply is given that from the verse dealing with Boaz
there is no proof of divine approval, only that Boaz used this form
of greeting. But in the second verse it is the angel that uses this form
of greeting and hence there is evidence of divine approval.
Of course, it is not always necessary for a cleft to be present in order for
contrast to succeed. (6), the constructed noncleft equivalent of (5),
demonstrates:
(6) To this the reply is given that from the verse dealing with Boaz
there is no proof of divine approval, only that Boaz used this form
of greeting. But in the second verse the angel uses this form of
greeting and hence there is evidence of divine approval.
However, in other cases, the contrastive effect appears to rely on the
presence of the cleft. For example, contrastive (7), when declefted, results
in the confusing (8):
(7) Doubling the selling space to 700 square feet was not to be the
greatest expense. It was the new fixtures and fittings to fill this space
that would be costly.
(8) ?Doubling the selling space to 700 square feet was not to be the
greatest expense. The new fixtures and fittings to fill this space would
be costly.
Likewise, when (9) is declefted, the result, (10), has lost contrast:
(9) Quite a few of you have asked about tipping, and these days
problems can arise. A nice old-fashioned housemaid, labelled by
cap and apron, is easy enough; when you leave you will give her
your little present as a thankyou for looking after you. It is the
t(lady who obliges" that can confound you; on that point, the sim-
plest way is to quietly consult your hostess.
(10) Quite a few of you have asked about tipping, and these days
problems can arise. A nice old-fashioned housemaid, labelled by
cap and apron, is easy enough; when you leave you will give her
your little present as a thankyou for looking after you. The "lady
who obliges" can confound you; on that point, the simplest way is
to quietly consult your hostess.
In what follows, we take the view that contrast is a coherent relationship,
and that special properties of the cleft and how its content is integrated
into the discourse model allow contrastive effects to be retrieved. In
particular, what is important is the cleft's capacity to promote particular
attachments to the hierarchical discourse structure and discourage others.
We will show that, in cases where the "default" discourse attachment
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turns out fortuitously to be the correct one for the retrieval of the
contrastive relationship, the cleft is not vital for contrast. In other cases,
however, the cleft cannot be dispensed with, and this is where a nondefault
attachment is required for contrast to work.
2.2. Comment-clause clefts in discourse
Two main observatins, due to Prince (1978), have been made about the
discourse effects of comment-clause clefts: that they are in some sense
"backgrounding" devices, and that they convey information that is
"known fact." Below, we also add some observations of our own, expand-
ing the notion of "backgrounding" to a more general coherence relation
of which Prince's data represent one subtype.
The "backgrounding" effect. Prince (1978: 902) points out that for
examples like (11), the information conveyed is "background material
... subordinate in importance to what follows":
(11) It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that many social scientists
have become aware of the scientific potential of sociolinguistics. ...
Yet their popularity has often deformed Bernstein's arguments;...
he has been made to say that lower class children are linguistically
"deprived." ... In fact, Bernstein's views are much more complex
than that. First. ...
While the suggestion that information is "subordinate in importance" is
intuitively plausible, it is possible to specify further what kinds of back-
grounding appear to be taking place by further analysis of the data.
Prince notes, for example, that the subordination relation involved is
often (although not always) one of cause and effect, where the clefted
proposition is often intended to be interpreted as the cause. She gives
this example:
(12) Here ... were the ideas which Hitler was later to use. ... His
originality lay in his being the only politician of the Right to apply
them to the German scene after the First World War. It was then
that the Nazi movement, alone among the nationalist and conserva-
tive parties, gained a great mass following and, having achieved this,
won over the support of the Army, the President of the Republic,
and... big business — three "long-established institutions" of great
power. The lessons learned in Vienna proved very useful indeed.
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Prince (1978: 902) explains the effect of the cleft in (12) as follows:
... If the third sentence of [12] read Then, the Nazi movement..., it would tend
to suggest a separate event, and we would lose the notion that it was all H's
doing — a notion conveyed very strongly by the /^-cleft's subordinating effect,
and underlined (though still not asserted) by the last sentence (Prince 1978: 902).
Prince's suggestion, then, is that clefts can serve as suitable vehicles for
delivering information that is backgrounded to the main flow of the
discourse, or that is contingently related to it, by cause-and-effect.
In addition to the cause-and-effect relations noted by Prince, our own
data reveal another, related "backgrounding" function: the use of clefts
for a form of subordination that influences the interpretation of the
content of the cleft in terms of the TEMPORAL development of the dis-
course. In (13), for example, an //-cleft is being used to introduce back-
ground information elaborating on the nature of a protagonist in the
discourse (Mr. Butler). This is done by describing an event that he was
involved in at some previous time:
(13) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet the challenge
of the "Ban-the-Bomb" demonstrators head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
4. It was Mr. Butler who authorised action which ended in 32
members of the Committee of 100 being imprisoned.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were each jailed for
a week.
The effect of the cleft is to cause the "background" information about
the authorization of action to be interpreted as as occurring PRIOR to the
events introduced in lines 1-3 — the decision, the cancellation of leave,
and the preparation of secret plans. A constructed noncleft version of
the same discourse, however, does not support the same temporal inter-
pretation. In fact, we can see that what we might term the temporally
REGRESSIVE effect of the cleft is removed, creating a rather different effect.
The result, (14), has the "authorization of action" described in the
declefted sentence occurring in simple temporal progression from the
"cancellation of police leave" — in other words, AFTER the events intro-
duced in lines 1-3:
(14) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet the challenge
of the "Ban-the-Bomb" demonstrators head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
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4. Mr. Butler authorised action which ended in 32 members of the
Committee of 100 being imprisoned.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were each jailed for
a week.
The cleft therefore has a critical effect on the order in which the events
reported are understood to have happened.
The "known-fact" effect. A further pragmatic feature belonging to clefts
is suggested by Prince (1978), namely that /i-clefts share a property that
has been characterized as the known-fact effect. Prince states,
Their function, or at least one of their functions, is TO MARK A PIECE OF
INFORMATION AS FACT, known to some people although not yet known to the
intended hearer. Thus they are frequent in historical narrative, or wherever the
speaker wishes to indicate that s/he does not wish to take personal responsibility
for the truth or originality of the statement being made (Prince 1978: 899-900).
Prince proposes this description for clefts of both types, but it is clear to
us that the effect is much stronger in the case of the comment-clause
cleft. In these clefts, the speaker can introduce "new" information in the
cleft clause, using the presuppositional nature of that part of the cleft to
signal that the information is to be treated as if it had been there all
along. A significant feature, then, is that the information must be regarded
as not open to conversational negotiation. Delin (1992) proposed that a
speaker who uses an #-cleft that conveys new information in the comple-
ment is indicating that the information being communicated did not
originate with the speaker, and, while they may believe it themselves at
the time of utterance, ultimate responsibility for the truth of the informa-
tion rests elsewhere.
In topic-clause clefts, whether the known-fact effect may be present is
difficult to determine, since a much stronger signal overrides it: the fact
that the information borne by the cleft clause is already known and
salient to BOTH speaker and hearer. It is not open to negotiation, but for
a much more mundane reason than that the speaker is somehow "dis-
claiming" the information. Its nonnegotiability arises simply out of the
fact that it is "given" — that is, it has already been heard and accepted
by the interlocutors.
Below, we examine how backgrounding and the known-fact effect
arise, looking closely at the interaction between cleft features such as
presupposition and information structure and the way these influence the
integration of cleft content into the discourse model. Particularly impor-
tant in our account is the treatment of the Stative nature of the cleft
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copula. While a fully fledged integrated model of aspectual and temporal
semantics and discourse structure has yet to be formulated, we hope to
show for clefts at least the value of integrating temporal and aspectual
information into the discourse model. This approach yields insights into
cleft interpretation that a purely descriptive account does not and
accounts for the phenomena outlined above in a coherent way.
The main points of our account are the following:
1. Clefts convey a presupposed state, event, or process (or complex of
any or all of the three) that must be attached to the current model of
the discourse at a point appropriate to its content.
2. Clefts additionally convey a further state description, due to the
presence of the copula be, whose relation to previous content is negotiated
in relation to the presupposed material.
3. The process of relating cleft state, presupposed material, and the
discourse context is further influenced by the shared or nonshared status
of the information borne by the cleft, and by other processes of inference.
3. Cleft content and aspectual type
Our main point is that the use of a cleft construction serves to present
the main eventuality reported in the sentence as a state: the presence of
the copular be as main verb ensures this. In order to appreciate this
claim, it is first necessary to explore briefly what is meant by the distinc-
tion between states and other kinds of eventuality.3 Basically, we take
the view that an utterance denotes at least one eventuality of some type.
Importantly for us, the aspectual type will determine the temporal relation
to other eventualities mentioned in a discourse. Although a range of
eventuality types and subtypes has been suggested, the relevant distinction
for current purposes is that between states and nonstates; in particular,
between states and events. From Bach (1986: 6), paradigmatic cases of
verb phrases exhibiting this distinction include the following:
States:
sit, be drunk, own x, love χ
Events:
build x, walk to Boston, notice, reach the top
The aspectual class of an utterance is typically determined by the aspec-
tual class of the lexical verb, by other elements within the verb phrase,
by temporal adverbials with which the verb phrase cooccurs, and by the
noun phrase itself. Linguistic context will also influence aspectual-class
assignment. For example, a verb normally taken to denote a process,
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such as (15a), can form part of a verb phrase denoting a protracted
event, as in (15b); and in combination with certain noun phrases, the
same verb phrase can form part of a sentence, as in (15c), denoting a
habitual state:
(15) a. ran
b. ran to the station
c. trains ran to the station
3.1. Clefts as state-makers
Various tests for stativeness have been proposed in the literature: Moens
(1987: 96-104) surveys the various diagnostic tests that have been sug-
gested. For our purposes, however, it is necessary simply to note that be
is the paradigmatic state-describing verb, and it is this that we would like
to focus on as crucial in the interpretation of the cleft construction,
distinguishing it from its noncleft counterpart.
While the noncleft counterpart of any cleft sentence could of course
describe an event, state, or process, or any complex combination of the
three, the cleft serves to subordinate this content to the main state
description. We can thus view a cleft as a syntactic vehicle for a semantic
function, which cleaves an existing (simple or complex) eventuality
description in two, presenting the state description introduced by the
cleft copula as the main eventuality of the sentence. The relationship
between the secondary eventuality and this main eventuality is similar to
that between the eventuality described by a relative clause and its matrix's
eventuality.
To illustrate, consider the examples below, variations on a passage of
text from Paretsky (1992: 318):
(16) a. I stirred the yolk up with the hash,
b. The fries were golden-brown.
(17) a. It was the yolk that I stirred up with the hash,
b. It was the fries that were golden-brown.
(16a) and (16b) denote an event and a state respectively: the event of
the speaker stirring the yolk; and the state of the fries being golden-
brown. Now, consider the clefted versions of these sentences. (17a)
denotes two eventualities: a state and an event, and (17b) denotes a pair
of states. In each case, the state description due to the cleft structure is
just the state of the entity (or set of entities) denoted by the clefted
constituent BEING the element satisfying the predicate (state, event, or
process) conveyed by the cleft clause. Therefore, (17a)'s eventualities are
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the event of the speaker stirring some entity x, and the state of the yolk
being that entity x9 while (17b)'s eventualities are the state of some y's
being golden-brown, and the state of the fries being that set of entities.
In each case, the main eventuality denoted by the cleft sentence is the
state corresponding to the copular verb. The event in (17a), and
the second state in (17b), are subordinate.
So, a cleft does not simply convert an event into a state; it CREATES a
new state. We can therefore refer to a cleft sentence's created state (CS)
and distinguish it from the original eventuality (OE). In the next section,
we indicate how clefting influences temporal interpretation in discourse
via the states it creates. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss the ramifications
for discourse structure and then indicate how the hypothesis accounts
for the phenomena introduced in section 2.
3.2. Clefts and the temporal structure of discourse
States play a distinctive role in the construction of a temporal model of
the discourse. There is a close relationship between the temporal relations
and discourse relations more generally; and this means that a cleft's
Stative aspect will affect the kinds of discourse relation that can be
inferred between the content of the cleft and the existing model of the
discourse. We look at the temporal model in this subsection and turn to
discourse relations more generally in section 4.3.
Consider first those theories that attempt to derive the temporal struc-
ture of discourse from the syntactic structures of a sequence of input
sentences. In the framework of discourse representation theory, work by
Partee (1984), Kamp and Rohrer (1983), and Hinrichs (1986) has indi-
cated that it is possible to exploit Reichenbach's (1947) notion of speech
time, event time, and reference time to drive a process that will add
temporal constraints to a discourse representation structure (DRS).4
In particular, in past-tense narrative, simple event expressions are taken
to locate an event at an event time corresponding to the existing reference
time, and in addition, to update the reference time to a point "just after"
that reference time. This new time will constitute the reference time for
the location of the next input expression. By contrast, state expressions
first locate the state as OVERLAPPING the existing reference-time; and
second do NOT update that reference time. Hence, the next input expres-
sion (denoting event or state) will be evaluated with respect to the same
reference time again. In this way, DRS construction can encode the
relative temporal locations of the various eventualities. In general, one
can say that simple event expressions "move a narrative along," while
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simple state expressions leave it where it is. More complex expressions,
containing temporal adverbials and perfective or progressive aspect,
require some complication in the DRS-construction rules.
Of course, the DRT notion of temporal overlap is a permissive relation.
An event sentence such as (18) followed by an event sentence (19)
describes two events, located at successive reference times. But consider
what happens when we follow (18) with one or other of the sentences in
(20). Each of these is Stative in aspect and can be thought of as having
been generated from (19) by one of the stativizing devices available in
English. DRT would say that all of the sentences in (20) denote states
that overlap the event already introduced. But closer examination reveals
subtle differences between the kinds of states created.
(18) The police arrived at the demonstration.
(19) Mr. Butler authorised action.
(20) a. Mr. Butler was authorising action.
b. Mr. Butler had authorised action.
c. Mr. Butler (usually) authorised action.
d. It was Mr. Butler who authorised action.
(20a) has progressive aspect; instead of denoting an event, it denotes a
state that is viewed in terms of a process ONGOING at the last reference
time established by (18). For this reason, progressive states, like that in
(20a), are usually taken to stretch both before and after their reference
time.
(20b) has perfect aspect; like (20a), it denotes a state. The past perfect
has been taken to introduce a flashback sequence, with a set of "secondary
reference points" (as in Kamp and Rohrer 1983: 260). On another view,
it can be seen to convert an event expression into an expression denoting
the CONSEQUENTIAL state of an earlier occurrence of the original event
(adapting the somewhat different analysis in Moens and Steedman
1987: 4). For this reason, perfect states, like that in (20b), can be
considered to overlap with the current reference time and stretch back
to the specific event that caused the consequent state.
(20c) can be read as a habitual; the use of usually encourages a reading
in which, instead of denoting a single event, (20c) denotes a state. This
time, the state is viewed in terms of a DISPOSITION to generate events of
a certain type, a disposition holding at the reference time established by
(18). For this reason, habitual states, like that in (20c), are usually taken
to stretch both before and after the current reference time.
Finally, (20d) is clefted. Unlike (20a)-(20c), it denotes two eventuali-
ties, an event (the original eventuality) and a state (the created state).
The event is one of someone authorizing action, while the state is that
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of Mr. Butler being that authorize!. A complex relationship, however, is
set up between the current reference time rl (that of the police arriving
at the demonstration), the time of the authorizing event, and the period
over which Mr. Butler's being the authorizer holds. Interestingly, the
state of Mr. Butler's being the authorizer does seem to display the state-
like behavior of overlapping a given reference time, but this reference
time does not appear to be r1. Instead, what is overlapped seems to be
the reference time of the embedded authorization event, which we can
label r2. That is, Mr. Butler's state of being the action-authorizer overlaps
the event of his authorizing the action.
Two points arise from this. The first is that, while it may seem obvious
that when one is authorizing, then one is being the authorizer, what is
remarkable about the cleft is that it presents the latter state as its PRIMARY
eventuality — its "main message." Noncleft sentences such as (19),
however, report only an event. While various states may be INFERRED
from such nonclefts, including the state of something being the agent of
a reported action, there is actually no reason to make such an inference.
As is the case with any utterance, many additional propositions may be
inferred, but these are not the primary concern of the speaker and are
not induced or encouraged by the means of expression.
The second point relates to our earlier statement that the reference
time that is overlapped by the cleft-created state is not the current
reference time. There are various ways of looking at this. On one view,
the original, presupposed eventuality can be seen as forming its own
subsidiary reference time, and the created state is then related to this. In
other words, the clefted authorization event acts very much like a perfec-
tive aspect "flashback sequence" in introducing a reference point at some
time in the past. Establishing the relationship between the reference time
of this event and the preceding discourse is a matter for inference, and
we address this further in the next two sections. It is sufficient to note
here that the original eventuality's reference time can be either very
distant from the existing reference time — earlier or later — or identical
to it. Our view is that these differences largely reflect the distinctions
between the two types of cleft described in section 1.2, including the
different ways in which they are integrated into the model of the current
discourse.
In a discourse context, then, we can say that clefts resemble other
stativizing devices, in that their main eventuality, a state, overlaps with
an established reference time. In the cleft case, the reference time is that
provided by original, presupposed eventuality, and the relationship
between this time and the preceding discourse may be relatively close or
relatively lax. Because of the stative aspect of its assertion, the cleft
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sentence, like the other stative devices, does not update reference time.
While other constructions involve states that are ongoing, or consequen-
tial, or dispositional, however, clefts involve states that are "existential':
the state of the element denoted by the clefted constituent BEING the
element that satisfies the predicate in the presupposition.
As we have said, the DRT notion of temporal overlap is a permissive
relation and does not directly capture the differences between the kinds
of states encountered in natural discourses. We therefore turn in the next
section to more complex models of discourse structure, which attempt to
capture relationships beyond the purely temporal. We have concentrated
here on syntactic devices, such as clefts and perfects, for signalling states.
This is not because we believe that consequent states, for example, need
to be explicitly marked as such; interpreters may indeed exploit world
knowledge to interpret one eventuality as a consequence of another (cf.
Lascarides and Oberlander 1993a: 17-21). Rather, it is because we main-
tain that the cleft's state-making effect is central to the integration of
cleft content into discourse structure and plays an important role in the
explanation of the phenomena of interpretation described in section 2.
4. Discourse-structural effects
In this section, we show how clefts are integrated into structured dis-
course, taking into account both the aspectual considerations described
above, and the two different cleft types, topic-clause and comment-clause.
Given this, we go on in section 5 to discuss the backgrounding and
"known-fact" effects and show how contrast, or lack of it, can be
accounted for in terms of how cleft content is integrated into the dis-
course model.
4.1. Theories of discourse structure
In discourse theory, there is a consensus that discourses possess a hierar-
chical organization, and that we can distinguish two principal kinds of
attachment of incoming discourse SEGMENTS to the existing hierarchical
structure. It is generally agreed that, if a relationship exists at all between
the incoming discourse segment and the existing structure, that segment
can be added to the structure by either coordination or subordination.
That is, the new segment may be attached either as a "sister," at the
same level in the hierarchical organization, or as a "daughter" to an
existing accessible "mother" node. Moreover, it is useful to assume that
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different types of coherence relations exist between parts of the discourse,5
since this seems to further specify the rhetorical function served by each
segment. With respect to clefts, we wish to pursue the view that the two
types of clefts share a discourse-structural description but differ on their
effects on coherence relations.
Here, we use a reasonably neutral notation to describe hierarchical
structure, simplified from Polanyi's (1988) discourse parse trees. We link
nodes corresponding to utterances by arcs indicating hierarchical struc-
ture: in a rather obvious way, two nodes coordinate when they are sisters
with a common mother; and one subordinates the other when it is its
mother. Scha and Polanyi's (1988) approach is appealing because it
indicates schematically how to calculate discourse structural attachment.
In their framework, a plausible means of attaching incoming information
into the existing hierarchical discourse structure is to attempt to match
the semantic content of the information in question with that residing at
currently accessible nodes in the structure. We would suggest that the
content of the cleft is no exception to this, and that a sensible strategy
is to match the known or identifiable information — that is, the topic of
the cleft — with the existing structure. We therefore represent this explic-
itly in our informal notation by attaching the incoming content beneath
a node labelled by that topical content, or in Scha and Polanyi's (1988:
575) terms, the most specific common generalization shared between the
incoming and the existing information.6
In order to see how this works, let us look first at the integration of
the content borne by each of the two types of cleft. We follow the Gundel-
Hedberg view of "topic" described in section 1.2. Topical information is
thus seen as information that both speaker and addressee have previous
knowledge about or familiarity with, and that forms the part of the
utterance that the speaker intends to increase the addressee's knowledge
about, request information about, or otherwise get the addressee to take
as the subject for action.
4.2. Discourse-structural description
First, take a topic-clause cleft such as (21). We can usefully view the
topic-clause cleft as focusing attention on the question of which element
plays the role described by the presupposed predicate — in this case,
what element (what person) plays the role of agent in a breaking event:7
(21) A: So who broke this?
B: It was John who broke it.
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We can build a local structure as follows. First, A's utterance in (21) will
give rise to a single node in the discourse tree, as shown in (22).
(22) Schematic discourse structure:
broke-this(x)
The topic-clause cleft with its clearly marked topical information,
"Someone broke this," is matched straight away with the previous infor-
mation, giving rise to a generalization that represents the shared content
between the two segments, namely "someone broke this." This becomes
a node that dominates the two segments, which become sisters to one
another, embedded in relation to the topic node, as shown in (23).
(23) Schematic discourse structure:
broke-this(x)
broke-this(x) broke-this(j)
In the case of the comment-clause cleft, a similar process takes place.
This time, however, the topic information is not some predicate with a
missing argument, but an entity. While topic-clause clefts seem to focus
on entities or elements competing for a role in a presupposed predicate,
in comment-clause clefts the situation in reversed: what is focused upon
is a single entity or element about which a range of possible predications
can be made or are being made. We can see how a local structure for
this type of cleft might be built up by looking at the Mr. Butler example
again, repeated for convenience as (24).
(24) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet the challenge
of the "Ban-the-Bomb" demonstrators head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
4. It was Mr. Butler who authorised action which ended in 32
members of the Committee of 100 being imprisoned.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were each jailed for
a week.
First, we build a node for Mr. Butler's original decision, as shown in (25).
(25) Schematic discourse structure:
decided(Mr. B)
Following this, we can plausibly attach the information about "police
leave" as an elaboration of this content, as it details HOW Mr. Butler
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intends to meet the challenge of the demonstrators. As this information
further specifies that given in the first sentence, then, we can attach it as
a subordinated discourse segment, as shown in (26).
(26) Schematic discourse structure:
decided (Mr. B)
cancelled-leave
When we encounter the cleft sentence, for the purposes of computing
most specific common generalization, it is necessary to match the topical
information with the existing discourse tree. The topic of the cleft is
Mr. Butler. This does not match with the information about police leave
or secret plans, so it cannot attach to the most recently built node. It
does, however, match with the content of the initial sentence, that regard-
ing Mr. Butler's decision — both sentences are "about" Mr. Butler. We
therefore form a node uniting the two segments under a more abstract
generalization, "properties of Mr. Butler," as shown in (27).
(27) Schematic discourse structure:
properties-of-Mr B
decided(Mr B) authorized-action(Mr B)
cancelled-leave
4.3. Discourse coherence relations
At this stage, the structure of the discourses given above does not differ
from a structure that would have been built for any incoming information
with the same topic-comment structure: there is nothing special about
the fact that the information has been communicated via a cleft. The
effect of the cleft resides not at the level of what coordinations or
subordinations can be performed, but WHAT DISCOURSE RELATIONS HOLD
BETWEEN THE SEGMENTS. These differ for the two types of cleft and serve
to cut down the kinds of connection that hearer-readers can infer between
the incoming content and the existing tree.
It should be emphasised that coherence relations are different in kind
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from the temporal relations we discussed in section 3.2. Depending on
the detail of the theory, coherence relations are taken to hold between
discourse segments, or propositions corresponding to them. Temporal
relations, by contrast, hold between the eventualities denoted by the
sentences of the discourse. There is, of course, a close relationship between
these two sets of relations. In particular, various theories of discourse
intrepretation assume that, given certain background knowledge, if a
hearer-reader knows how two segments' eventualities are temporally
related, they can compute how the segments are coherence-related, and
vice versa (cf. Moore and Pollack 1992; Lasarides and Asher 1993a). For
current purposes, we may confine ourselves to indicating the cleft types'
differing coherence structures, and temporal structures. We do not here
attempt to show how one is actually computed from the other. A full
processing account would indicate how text, coherence structure, and
temporal structure are articulated in practice.8
For the moment, let us focus exclusively on discourse coherence rela-
tions. Taking topic-clause clefts first, we would suggest that two discourse
relations only are available: the relations of question-answer9 and contrast.
The question-answer relation is illustrated by (21) above. In this case,
the cleft provides the completion of a segment in which, in the left-hand
sister, a variable is given, and in the right-hand (clefted) segment, a value
is provided for that variable. The second relation, that of contrast, is
similar, except that the left- and right-hand sisters each provide COMPET-
ING instantiations for a variable. This would be the case in a discourse
such as (28):
(28) A: Idiot.
B: It's YOU that's the idiot.
In this case, competing instantiations are provided for the variable in
idiot(x). Contrast results because both instantiations cannot be true at
once: due to the use of the cleft, with its presupposition of uniqueness,
it is indicated that there is only one possible instantiation of idiot(x)·10
Otherwise, it could be true that there were two idiots, and contrast would
not result.
Both the contrast and the question-answer relation have in common
that the topic-clause cleft provides the COMPLETION of a discourse segment,
effectively closing off the dominating topic node and making it inacces-
sible for the building of further structure. This is because the topic domina-
ting the cleft content and its preceding sister(s) contains a variable, which
places a strong constraint on the development of the segment: it must
eventually instantiate that variable. Because of the uniqueness condition
conveyed by the cleft, the appearance of the cleft serves to indicate that
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the cleft content provides the SOLE instantiation of the waiting variable.
This instantiation therefore closes off the discourse segment dominated
by that topic.
The comment-clause cleft acts rather differently. As we noted above
and explain in more detail in section 5.1 below, the comment-clause cleft
supports various kinds of BACKGROUND discourse relation. In addition,
rather than closing off the segment to which it attaches, the comment-
clause cleft leaves the node to which it attaches open for further elabora-
tion. The reason for this relates to the fact that the content of the
comment-clause cleft attaches to a topical entity, rather than to a topical
proposition containing a variable. While the structure of the cleft indicates
that the topic entity is unique, it does not state that it is unique with
respect to any particular predicate. Given the proposed topic-comment
structure for the comment-clause cleft, the comment is not a unique
instantiation of an existing variable; instead it is simply an ordinary
predication. It is possible to make any number of different predications
about the same entity without violating the uniqueness condition. The
result of this is that the comment-clause does not act as a "segment
completer" like its topic-clause counterpart; it merely introduces an open-
ended embedded segment. Therefore, while the gross structure of the
discourse looks the same after the integration of both kinds of cleft, the
nature of the development of the subsequent discourse is markedly
different.
So, comment-clause clefts support various background relations, while
topic-clause ones support contrast and question-answer. But in support-
ing these particular relations, clefts obviously do more: they EXCLUDE
others. It has been observed elsewhere that a further important constraint
on the interpretation of cleft content is that neither type of cleft can
support the relation of narrative progression (cf. Delin 1989: 181). Using
a cleft, therefore, indicates that the speaker does NOT intend a relation
involving narrative progression. This is a significant constraint, since,
according to some accounts, narration or listing is the discourse relation
assigned by default in the absence of other information (cf. Thompson
1987; Scha and Polanyi 1988: 576; Lascarides and Asher 1993a).
5. The discourse interpretation of clefts
We have seen that topic-clause (TC) and comment-clause (CC) clefts
perform different functions in discourse, and that these functions can be
represented in terms of their role in discourse structure and the nature
of the relations between the nodes in that structure. In this section, we
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look at what it is about the structure of the clefts themselves, including
their aspectual nature, that determines their interpretation in discourse.
Both TCs and CCs are, of course, presuppositional. As we described
in section 3.1, any given cleft has at least one eventuality (state, event,
process, and combinations of the three) that corresponds with the presup-
posed content, and, in addition, a state description associated with the
main (copular) verb. We termed the former eventuality the original eventu-
ality (OE) and contrasted it with the cleft's existential state, which we
termed the created state (CS). The cleft in (29), for example, would yield
two states: the first, glossed as (30a), is the state due to the presupposition;
the second, glossed as (30b), is the state due to the copula and its
associated content:
(29) It is the "lady who obliges" that can confound you.
(30) a. Original eventuality (OE):
Something can confound you.
b. Created state (CS):
The "lady who obliges" is that thing.
The key to the processing of clefts, and the discourse-structural effects
outlined above, lies in the interaction of the presupposed original eventu-
ality and the created state. On the view of Haviland and Clark (1974)
and others, it is plausible to suppose that the sentence processor will first
attempt to integrate content for which it is likely to find a match already
in memory. Presuppositional material falls into this category, and van der
Sandt and Geurts (1991) extend DRT to model this view. They character-
ize presuppositions as anaphora with semantic content and contrast cases
in which presuppositions are "cancelled" from those in which they are
"realized." Cancellation occurs when a match in memory can be found;
this identification is akin to the binding of anaphora. Presuppositions are
realized only when no match can be found, and then accommodation
must be triggered. The processor attempts to add the material directly
to the discourse context, subject to various constraints.
On their model, a sentence containing a presupposition is represented
as a sentence-DRS, a triple consisting of a set of discourse markers, a
set of DRS conditions, and a (possibly empty) set of sentence-DRSs.
This third set corresponds to the presupposed portion of the sentence; it
must be dealt with by either binding or accommodation. By extending
DRT's definition of subordination, van der Sandt and Geurts define a
hierarchical structure on sentence-DRSs and can thereby specify an order
of priority for processing presuppositions. First, binding is attempted at
a lower level in the structure; then it is tried at a higher level; next
accommodation is attempted at a higher level; and finally it is tried at a
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lower level. Only after the presupposition has been dealt with will the
rest of the sentence be integrated into the new discourse context.
Applied to cleft sentences, the model predicts that TCs will have their
presuppositions dealt with at the matching stage, whereas CCs will have
theirs dealt with at the accommodation stage.
With TCs, as in (24), matching succeeds at some point or other; here,
the predicate can confound matches the earlier problems can arise. In such
cases, therefore, the presupposition from the cleft clause is successfully
attached to the existing discourse structure first. Then, the content associ-
ated with the clefted constituent is integrated. At the temporal level, this
means that OE is the first of the cleft's eventualities to be integrated. If
it is an event, the reference time will thus be updated. CS, which is the
main eventuality, will then be integrated; since it is a state, it will overlap
with whatever reference time is current after OE's integration. And, of
course, it will not itself update that reference time. The net temporal
effect is that, when OE is an event, a TC cleft will update reference time
once and leave CS overlapping the new time.
However, with CCs, as in the Mr. Butler case repeated in the next
section, matching always fails. The cleft clause bears information that
is new to the hearer and cannot be identified with earlier material.
Accommodation is only guaranteed11 to succeed at the last, and lowest,
level in the discourse structure, and hence the presupposition from the
cleft clause is accommodated with respect to the clefted constituent itself.
Once this has been achieved, the latter is integrated into the discourse
structure. At the temporal level, OE must first be assigned a new "subsid-
iary" reference time, unconnected to the existing temporal structure. The
main eventuality CS, being a state, then overlaps with the subsidiary
reference time. It is CS that is then related to the existing temporal
structure. OE is thus only indirectly related to the larger temporal struc-
ture, via its subsidiary reference time, contained with CS. The net tempo-
ral effect is that, EVEN WHEN OE is AN EVENT, a CC cleft will not update
reference time at all. CS overlaps the prior reference time and also
overlaps the reference time associated with OE. But these two reference
times have no fixed relation.
There are three main points to note. First, at the temporal level, the
basic difference between TC and CC is that only the former will update
reference time when the original eventuality is an event. Second, given
that matching content — binding presuppositions — can succeed at
higher levels within the discourse structure, the content from a TC cleft
can be related to nodes higher up in the discourse parse tree: TCs can
thus be associated with "discourse pops," closing off prior discourse
segments. By contrast, given that accommodation succeeds at the lower
 - 10.1515/ling.1995.33.3.465
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/02/2016 12:05:06PM
via University of Edinburgh
488 / Delin and J. Oberlander
levels, CC content will have less of a tendency to be associated with
higher nodes or discourse popping.12 Third, echoing the discussion in
section 4.3, among CCs, we can distinguish two possible discourse effects.
After the cleft has been processed, the subsidiary reference time associated
with OE is available, and subsequently mentioned eventualities could
progress on from it. At the discourse level, subsequent material would
be seen as elaborations within an embedded discourse segment, initiated
by the cleft. However, OE is not the main eventuality of the sentence;
hence, by default, one would expect the discourse to continue on from
the (unchanged) main reference time, which CS is known to overlap. In
this case, OE would not anchor the beginning of a chain of reference
times, and at the discourse level, OE would instead appear to fall into
the background, with the discourse continuing directly from the point
before the cleft was encountered.
The next two subsections consider backgrounding and the known-fact
effect, by applying the general picture of comment-clause clefts to the
data introduced in section 2.2.
5.1. The background and regression effects
We can now account for both Prince's observations regarding the back-
grounding effect of comment-clause clefts, and our own. Recall the origi-
nal data, repeated for convenience here as (31), (32), and (33):
(31) It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that many social scientists
have become aware of the scientific potential of sociolinguistics. ...
Yet their very popularity has often deformed Bernstein's argu-
ments; ... he has been made to say that lower class children are
linguistically "deprived." ... In fact, Bernstein's views are much
more complex than that. First. ...
(32) Here ... were the ideas which Hitler was later to use. ... His
originality lay in his being the only politician of the Right to apply
them to the German scene after the First World War. It was then
that the Nazi movement, alone among the nationalist and conserva-
tive parties, gained a great mass following and, having achieved this,
won over the support of the Army, the President of the Republic,
and... big business — three "long-established institutions" of great
power. The lessons learned in Vienna proved very useful indeed.
(33) 1. Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, decided to meet the challenge
of the "Ban-the-Bomb" demonstrators head-on.
2. Police leave was cancelled
3. and secret plans were prepared.
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4. // was Air. Butler who authorised action which ended in 32
members of the Committee of 100 being imprisoned.
5. The Committee's president and his wife were each jailed for
a week.
Let us take Bernstein first. The cleft sentence is the first in the discourse.
OE, the original eventuality, can be glossed as the perfect state "Social
scientists have become aware of sociolinguistics' potental through x."
CS, the created state, may be glossed as "Basil Bernstein's writings are
x." Since OE is a state, it contains its subsidiary reference time, ri. On
a Reichenbachian account of the perfect, an event el — of social scientists
becoming aware of the potential — occurred at some time ix prior to r±.
CS contains rx and overlaps OE. We cannot directly tell what relation
holds between CS and tl; but, knowing the writings must generally exist
in order to have effects on people's mental states, we can infer that CS
also contains el and t1. Finally, since CS does not update reference time,
information from the second sentence of the discourse will overlap in
time with CS also. Thus, as Prince suggests, Bernstein's influence indeed
functions as background to what follows.
Now consider Hitler.13 This time, the cleft is not discourse-initial. In
the immediately prior sentence, we are presented with a property of
Hitler — his originality — which is described in terms of an event — his
uniquely applying certain ideas after the First World War. On the DRT
account, once this event is processed, reference time will be updated to
a time r± just after application. OE can be glossed as the event "The
Nazi movement gained a mass following at x" CS may be glossed as
"That time (then) was x." As a simple event, OE is taken to occur at a
subsidiary reference time r2 (which here equals x). CS contains r2 and
the event OE. CS also overlaps r±. In fact, because then is a temporal
anaphor, rl is identical to jc, and hence to r2. Thus, the original event —
of gaining a mass following — is seen to occur "just after" the event of
applying ideas. This temporal proximity explains Prince's intuition that
a cause-effect relation is present: we are left to infer that the one event
caused the other. Notice as usual that CS does not update the main
reference time, which remains ri, and that since CS is a state, whatever
is integrated next will overlap with it.
Finally, let us turn to Mr. Butler. The cleft sentence is on the fourth
line in the discourse. By this point, we have encountered one event —
the decision — and two states — leave cancellation and plan preparation.
The reference time is rl9 just after the decision event, and contained
within the two overlapping states. OE can be glossed as "Some entity x
authorized action which ended in various people being imprisoned." CS
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may be glossed as "Mr. Butler being x." Since OE is a simple event, it
can be taken to occur at a subsidiary reference time r2. Being a state, CS
contains OE and r2, overlaps r1? and does not update the main reference
time. Whereas with the Hitler case, we could easily compute the relation
between r^ and r2, here we have less information. However, the state of
Mr. Butler's being the authorizer must have been initiated by an authori-
zation event, at the initial bound /3 of state CS, and the event could
therefore have occurred before jy. the authorization event PRECEDES the
decision event mentioned earlier. This explains why there is a feeling of
"temporal regression" and the associated removal from the main time
line; further world knowledge would be required to find a more specific
location for Mr. Butler's action. Note in addition that we also have here
a case in which the sentence AFTER the cleft ([33], line 5) appears not to
revert to the main narrative line (established by lines 1-3), but to continue
instead with the subsidiary reference time established by OE in the cleft
sentence at line 4. Given the content of line 5, we might infer that the
authorization event occurred sufficiently far in the past for various legal
formalities to have been run through.
Thus, the Bernstein, Hitler, and Butler cases in (32), (32), and (33)
have subtly differing temporal structures. We observed in section 4.3 that
discourse processing can exploit such temporal information to determine
which discourse coherence relations hold between discourse segments; we
also suggested that comment-clause clefts supported "various" back-
grounding discourse relations. We may now ask whether the differing
temporal structures assigned to our data will actually lead to differing
coherence relations. In fact, the answer to this question depends upon
the precise granularity of a theory of discourse coherence. In a theory
with many discourse relations (such as Mann and Thompson 1987), the
temporal differences here may well lead to different coherence relations
for the discourses. But in a theory with relatively few (such as Hobbs
1985), the differences may not be apparent at the discourse coherence
level. On at least one Hobbsian account (due to Lascarides and Asher
1993a: 465-466), in the absence of information to the contrary, once we
have established that two clauses denote overlapping states, we can
directly establish that the clauses are connected by the (single) background
discourse relation.
However, without committing ourselves to one or other theory, we
cannot give a final answer to the question. In the meantime, it suffices
to note the following. The Bernstein case introduces a state that overlaps
with whatever eventuality follows it; at a discourse level the cleft sentence
may therefore evoke discourse-initial background to subsequent senten-
ces. The Hitler case closely juxtaposes two events, of which the former
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can be inferred to cause the latter; at a discourse level, the cleft may
therefore evoke a result of the previous sentence. The Butler case "flashes
back" the reader, creating a mini-time line; at a discourse level, the cleft
may therefore evoke prior background to the current narrative thread.
The significance of fixing upon one discourse relation rather than
another is perhaps most easily appreciated by considering the DIFFERENCE
in the discourse relations evoked by a cleft, as opposed to its canonical
counterpart. Let us therefore conclude this discussion of comment-clause
clefts by considering why "declefting" can have variable effects on CCs.
Substituting a noncleft for a cleft seems often to disrupt the meaning of
the discourse. The reason lies in the loss of the created state by means
of which content is integrated. What remains is very similar to the original
eventuality (state, event, or process), and this can give the impression
that the speaker-writer is introducing a new event into the discourse and
updating it in the relevant ways. By contrast, in the clefted versions, any
events introduced by the created state itself are either implicit or identifi-
able in the previous context. Safe declefting must therefore involve the
preservation of the stative aspect of the relevant cleft sentence; replace-
ment with a perfect declefted sentence should normally suffice.
Notice, however, that where the declefted sentence is already stative,
declefting should not disrupt the coherence of the narrative so severely.
But even in these cases an zY-cleft still performs a significant function,
because it denotes not one state, but two, and can in this way serve to
restrict discourse relations. Consider the invented examples (34) and (35):
(34) Victoria turned over the body. She knew the killer's identity.
(35) Victoria turned over the body. It was she who knew the killer's
identity.
As we suggested in section 3.2, where world knowledge permits, we will
interpret a state described after an event not as overlapping with the
described event, but as being initiated by it. So here, it is natural to say
that the second eventuality in (34) is a causal result of the first: Victoria
came to know the killer's identity on account of her turning over the
body. However, the use of a cleft in (35), while not altering the already
stative aspect of the sentence, introduces an extra state. In both cases,
after integrating Victoria turned over the body, we have a reference time
r l5 just after the turning-over event. And in both cases, we may roughly
say that OE is the state of knowing the killer's identity. Now, in (34),
OE overlaps ri and is potentially initiated by the prior event. But in (35),
OE overlaps its own subsidiary reference time r2, which is contained in
CS. CS in turn overlaps r1; but now we have no direct relation between
rx and r2. In the latter case, it's still true that Victoria knows the killer's
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identity; but it no longer seems as if she knows this because she just
turned over the body.
In the Hitler case, as Prince (1978: 902) argued, a comment-clause
cleft seems to create a cause-and-effect reading. Here, however, a com-
ment-clause cleft seems capable of effectively deleting such a reading:
through its extra state, it blocks an otherwise feasible discourse relation,
such as narration or result. The declefted discourse in (34) is still coherent,
but it will possess a different interpretation, on account of its different
configuration of discourse relations, and the form of narrative progression
that follows from them. What this goes to show, of course, is that when
a cleft is used in a sentence that would be stative even without it, it can
still be performing pragmatic work, by virtue of its restriction on possible
discourse relations.
5.2. The known-fact effect
We can now turn to the explanation of the known-fact effect. As we
noted earlier, Prince (1978) proposed that what the various clefts had in
common was that they marked a piece of information as fact, known to
some people, but not necessarily to the hearer. By indicating that they
do not accept responsibility for the truth of the statement, the speaker
at once denies that they are the "informational origin" and makes it
clear that the validity of the statement is nonnegotiable. We have argued
that the known-fact effect occurs only in comment-clause clefts. We would
like to suggest that the aspectual effect of the cleft helps explain it in the
following way.
Given some arbitrary piece of information to transmit, a speaker-
writer can choose between using event, process, and state expressions to
convey it. Each choice emphasizes different aspects of the information,
by choosing what to make explicit, and what to leave implicit. When the
speaker uses an event expression, they are explicitly referring to an event,
but also implicitly introducing the state that results from the occurrence
of the event, if such a state exists. Equally, when a speaker uses a state
expression, they explicitly refer to a state but also implicitly introduce
two further events; the beginning and ending of that state. Now,
Lascarides and Oberlander (1993a: 22) suggest that if there is no
"explicit" indication of where a state starts — via the mention of causes
or the use of temporal adverbials — then the exact starting point of the
state can be assumed to be irrelevant. Thus, conversely, if the speaker
deems the exact start of the state to be irrelevant to the discourse in this
sense, then they can use a state expression.
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An /i-cleft introduces two eventualities: the original eventuality (either
an event or a state). The latter is denoted by the main verb, and it is the
cleft sentence's main message. While it is true that the original eventuality
might have initiated the created state, it is the latter's temporal location
in the discourse that is taken to be most important. Consider once again
the Mr. Butler case, from (33). The original eventuality was the event
"Some entity χ authorized action which ended in various people being
imprisoned"; the created state was "Mr. Butler being x" Of course, the
latter came into being because of the former; but it's the state that is the
main point of the utterance, the event being presupposed. The state is
directly related to the current discourse reference time; the event is linked
to the discourse only via its relation to the state.
Such a cleft is therefore a natural choice for a speaker who wishes
simply to assert that an eventuality is current at the reference time,
without indicating anything further about it. So clefts can deliver informa-
tion that might otherwise have been stated earlier without disrupting the
flow of the discourse (cf. Polanyi's [1986: 85-87] "true starts"); and they
can also deliver information without commitment to the exact temporal
location of an initiating event.
5.3. Toward an account of contrast
Finally, the account just outlined also gives us an explanation for the
topic-clause cleft's contrastive behavior. As we noted earlier, contrast is
a coherent relationship based on finding the current topic and matching
it with some proposition from earlier in the discourse that shares the
same topic: put simply, what seems to be required for contrast is some
comparison, discussion, or dispute about the applicability of a shared
predicate Ρ to each of the contrasting elements. In order to retrieve a
contrastive relationship, the predicate in the contrasting sentence must
be linked up with the previous occurrence of Ρ predicated of the con-
trastive antecedent. But this predicate is simply the shared topic of the
current sentence and the sentence in which the contrastive antecedent
lies. Hence, retrieving the contrast relation is therefore a matter of finding
the topic of the current sentence and matching it with some preceding
utterance that shares the same topic. In cases where this topic-matching
fails, the contrast relation will not be retrieved.
Of course, the topic-matching process relies in many cases on the
correct interpretation of the discourse structure, and we saw in section 4.3
above how the discourse structure for contrastive clefts might be built
up. The contrastive sentence reaches back into the discourse and com-
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pletes a relationship with the antecedent contrastive segment — the one
that introduces the topical predicate along which contrast operates. These
two segments are then sisters, dominated by their shared topic node. The
first sister encodes a negative example of the topic: that is, something
that is NOT a suitable instantiation of the missing argument in the topic.
The second sister, the content of the cleft, represents the correct instantia-
tion. When the topic on the basis of which the contrast is to operate is
highly salient and highly accessible, it is often sufficient to indicate, by
explicit repetition, by prosody, or by both, the topic to which the incom-
ing segment is to be attached. This accounts for the acceptability of the
decleft of example (36) given in section 2.1, repeated here with its
declefted counterpart:
(36) To this the reply is given that from the verse dealing with Boaz
there is no proof of divine approval, only that Boaz used this form
of greeting. But in the second verse it is the angel that uses this
form of greeting and hence there is evidence of divine approval.
(37) To this the reply is given that from the verse dealing with Boaz
there is no proof of divine approval, only that Boaz used this form
of greeting. But in the second verse the angel uses this form of
greeting and hence there is evidence of divine approval.
In many cases, however, locating the correct attachment point for the
incoming segment is not so simple, and it is here that clefts can support
contrastive relationships that are not so clear from the corresponding
noncleft. There are two particular contexts in which this is true: where
the antecedent topic is remote in the discourse structure, and when the
topic of the cleft, for reasons of economy or variety of expression, does
not clearly cospecify with any previously occurring topic, leading to the
need to infer the relevant relationship on the basis of generalizations
made about the topic identified in the cleft. If clefts appearing in either
situation are declefted, a systematic and predictable misinterpretation of
the structure of the discourse takes place — we would argue, due to the
loss of the aspectual information provided by the cleft that prompts the
search for an antecedent.
As Scott and de Souza (1990: 53) suggest, "the greater the amount of
intervening text between the propositions of a relation, the more difficult
it will be to reconstruct its message." Intervening text, however it is itself
related to the discourse tree, increases the difficulty involved in matching
the contrastive topic to its required antecedent. A case of textual distance
between a cleft and its contrastive antecedent is represented by (38),
repeated from section 2.1. Note again the infelicity of the declefted (39):
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(38) Quite a few of you have asked about tipping, and these days
problems can arise. A nice old-fashioned housemaid, labelled by
cap and apron, is easy enough; when you leave you will give her
your little present as a thankyou for looking after you. It is the
"lady who obliges" that can confound you; on that point, the sim-
plest way is to quietly consult your hostess.
(39) Quite a few of you have asked about tipping, and these days
problems can arise. A nice old-fashioned housemaid, labelled by
cap and apron, is easy enough; when you leave you will give her
your little present as a thankyou for looking after you. The "lady
who obliges" can confound you; on that point, the simplest way is
to quietly consult your hostess.
In the discourse, the topic is stated explicitly: we can frame it as problems
of tipping. Then follows the statement a housemaid ... is easy enough,
which, by analogy with the discussion of the discourse structure of
contrasting pairs given above, acts as a nonexample of the topic (i.e.
housemaids do not constitute the problem given in the topic) and the
left-hand sister of the contrastive pair. Then follows an elaboration on
the housemaids topic, how you tip her when you leave. This can be seen
as subordinated to the left-hand contrastive sister, as shown in (40).
(40) Schematic discourse structure:
problems-of-tipping
nproblem(housemaid) problem(lady-who-obliges)
give-present
The cleft finally provides the positive instantiation of the topic: a situation
that is a tipping problem. However, by this point in the discourse struc-
ture, there is an ambiguity as to where to attach this incoming segment.
Should it be attached to the topmost topic node, or to the more recent
elaboration about your little present, by either coordination or subordina-
tion? We suggest that, since this node is both lower and more recent, it
represents a more salient attachment point for incoming information.
Without the cleft, as in (39), this is the attachment point chosen. The
result is that no match is made between the decleft topic and the preceding
discourse: the contribution of the decleft is interpreted as a new eventual-
ity, to be inferrably related as some kind of narrative addition to the
most recent information. As a result, no cospecification is perceived
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between the decleft topic and any antecedent.14 When the cleft is missing,
discourse advancement is the default. While it is a matter of the content
of the individual proposition what attachment is actually made, it seems
likely that the incoming segment will be interpreted as a new thematic
development — that is, it is likely to be given some default attachment
more appropriate to narrative progression.15
6. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have tried to bring together a number of observations
about clefts in order to account for their disparate discourse functions.
We began with the observation that there are two major cleft types, and
that these are differentiated in function: clefts of the topic-clause type
seem to be confined to the functions of question-answer and contrast,
while comment-clause clefts appear to support various background rela-
tions, of which cause and effect and temporal regression are two subtypes.
Furthermore, as Prince (1978) suggests, clefts share the property of
indicating that the information they convey is in some sense "known
fact." We take the view that these functions are appropriately charac-
terized in terms of discourse relations between incoming content and the
existing model of the discourse.
The account we have presented captures the features common to clefts
of both types, while also taking into account the factors that differentiate
the interpretation of the two cleft types. One common factor is that clefts
convey an additional state description due to the copular verb: we drew
on theories of aspectual semantics to capture the processing implications
of this. The second common factor is that clefts are presuppositional,
and that presuppositions are processed differently from asserted material.
The implications of presupposition and stative aspect for integration of
cleft content could not be fully explored, however, without taking into
account the role of information structure. In our account, the latter is
characterized in terms of the topic-comment structure of clefts, and it is
here that the source of variability in cleft interpretation lies. In order to
account for the differing interpretations of topic-clause and comment-
clause clefts, then, we drew upon van der Sandt and Geurts's (1991)
account of presupposition integration, which allowed us to differentiate
between new (comment) and old (topic) presupposed information. The
final piece of the puzzle comes once again from aspectual semantics: we
showed that information structure also influences the relationship that is
assumed to hold between the presupposed eventuality borne by the cleft
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and the state created by its copula. This results in differing discourse
interpretations for sentences with different information structure.
We have suggested, then, that presupposition, information structure,
and the semantics of aspect, through their influence on discourse process-
ing, lead to predictable effects. We have not, however, been able to offer
a complete account of the relationships between discourse relations and
temporal information in discourse processing. One obvious next step,
therefore, is to embed our analysis within a formal discourse-processing
framework, organizing the rather eclectic range of representations
adopted in our account into a more integrated whole. In addition, it
would be interesting to extend the approach to other syntactic construc-
tions where a similar distinction in information structure and discourse
function has been observed: for example, Ward's (1985) preposing con-
structions. Further, we might wish to look more closely at the position
of clefts within the broader range of copular constructions, examining
the implications of our account for other cleft and cleftlike constructions.
We have not, for example, addressed the fact that clefts can be further
differentiated in semantic terms by means of predicational and specifica-
tional function: our examples are purely specificational. This distinction
appears to be relevant for copular constructions of all kinds and could
provide an appropriate vehicle for extending the treatment beyond the
well-known kinds of ζϊ-cleft dealt with here.
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2. A separation between presupposition and information status for clefts is suggested by
Prince (1978) and argued for in detail in Delin (i.p.).
3. See Vendler (1967), Hinrichs (1986), Dowty (1986), and Moens and Steedman (1987)
for detailed analyses of these "aspectual types."
4. We do not wish to maintain that a reference-time-based account is the best that can be
provided. It is, however, a convenient representational tool.
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5. Of course, the debate on what coherence relations are in general, and which types are
relevant in particular, is by no means concluded: compare the differing descriptions of
relations in Grosz and Sidner (1986), Hobbs (1985), Mann and Thompson (1987),
and Moore and Pollack (1992), for example.
6. This view is compatible with approaches in the psycholinguistic literature, in which
incoming information is parsed into given and new components, given information
being attached to the existing structure first (cf. Haviland and Clark 1974; Clark and
Haviland 1977).
7. Here, the content of the incoming cleft integrates smoothly with the existing discourse
model, since no contradiction is involved. However, in dialogue, this type of cleft is
frequently used to challenge existing content: for example, // was John who broke it
could be a response to the assertion Max broke it. In this case, the uniqueness condition
conveyed by the cleft would result in mutual exclusivity between the two propositions,
and inference would have to be carried out to decide which proposition was to be
maintained, and which discarded. It is assumed that truth maintainance would be
carried out on the integration of any information, regardless of its syntactic vehicle.
8. A promising approach would be to parallel the models constructed for the discourse
effects of temporal connectives (Lascarides and Oberlander 1993b) and perfective
aspect (Lascarides and Asher 1993b).
9. It has been suggested (cf. van Kuppeveit 1991, inter alia) that cleft sentences serve to
answer implicit questions in discourse, and that this is a major part of their function.
We would argue that this appears to be a legitimate proposal for topic-clause clefts, but
its unlikeliness for the content of comment-clause clefts highlights the suggestion as
having its basis not in syntax, but in information structure.
10. It might be suggested here that the uniqueness presupposition is due not to the cleft
structure but to the presence of the definite referring expression the idiot, which is of
course itself presuppositional. Note, however, that the uniqueness presupposition
would still hold even if the example were It's you that's an idiot.
11. Subject, of course, to considerations of consistency and likeliness.
12. Of course, we indicated in section 4.2 that there is, in principle, no reason why indivi-
dual CCs and TCs should not share discourse structural descriptions.
13. Notice that with this case, we can take the clefted constituent to have "scope" over a
conjunction forming a complex cleft clause. It is simpler, however, to take the sentence
as a whole to conjoin a simple cleft sentence with a set of (elliptical) clauses. We thus
pursue the latter option, but the example can be appropriately reanalyzed given the
former option.
14. There are clear links here to the notion that presuppositional environments like the
cleft clause are ANAPHORIC, regardless of the information status (given, new, inferrable
etc.) of their content. This was first suggested by van der Sandt (1989) and is explored
more fully for /r-clefts by Delin (1992).
15. The general consensus is that this is the default attachment node, in keeping with
theory in other areas of discourse processing hi which "low right attachment" is
favored. See for example Polanyi (1988: 619), who attributes low right discourse
attachment to Reichman (1978). Of course, in some cases, the default attachment will
fortuitously be the correct one, in which case contrast (and any other coherence relation
in which the cleft is involved) will not disappear.
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